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Abstract
Cancellable biometrics (CB) as a means for biometric
template protection approach refers to an irreversible yet
similarity preserving transformation on the original tem-
plate. With similarity preserving property, the matching
between template and query instance can be performed in
the transform domain without jeopardizing accuracy per-
formance. Unfortunately, this trait invites a class of at-
tack, namely similarity-based attack (SA). SA produces a
preimage, an inverse of transformed template, which can
be exploited for impersonation and cross-matching. In this
paper, we propose a Genetic Algorithm enabled similarity-
based attack framework (GASAF) to demonstrate that CB
schemes whose possess similarity preserving property are
highly vulnerable to similarity-based attack. Besides that,
a set of new metrics is designed to measure the effective-
ness of the similarity-based attack. We conduct the exper-
iment on two representative CB schemes, i.e. BioHashing
and Bloom-filter. The experimental results attest the vulner-
ability under this type of attack.
1. Introduction
Human biometrics as identity credential offers great us-
ability for identity management. Biometrics based authen-
tication systems have been widely deployed and common-
place. With the prevalent of biometrics systems, the public
are getting concern about the security and privacy of the
biometric templates if they are compromised. For instance,
if an adversary manages to retrieve an individual’s template,
impersonation with the stolen template is straightforward.
Furthermore, biometrics is intrinsically linked to individual
and it is limited, thus revocation and replacement like pass-
words are impossible. With the advancement of technology,
another critical threat on privacy is that the original biomet-
ric data can actually be reconstructed with high accuracy
[1–3].
Due to above concern, cancellable biometrics (CB) has
been devised for biometric templates. CB is a parameter-
ized irreversible yet revocable transform to ensure security
and privacy of the biometric template. [4–7]. Revocabil-
ity of CB demands the transformed template can be can-
celled and replaced by changing the parameter (or known as
helper data) whenever required. The transformed templates
should be independent to each other as well as with orig-
inal template to prevent cross-matching (unlinkability cri-
terion). This can be done with application-specific helper
data. Another vital criterion is irreversibility wherein the
original template should be computationally difficult be in-
verted from a single instance or multiple instances of trans-
formed templates with or without helper data.
Numerous CB schemes have been proposed in the litera-
ture and shown satisfy the CB criteria up to certain level.
Several specific attacks have also been proposed for CB
schemes such as brute-force inversion attack, dictionary at-
tack (or known as zero effort false accept attack), corre-
lation attack (or known as attacks via record multiplicity,
ARM) and similarity-based attack (also named masquerade
or preimage attack). (see review papers [4–7]). While cor-
relation attack is associated to unlinkability criterion, dic-
tionary attack exploits decision threshold of biometric sys-
tems and brute-force inversion is related to irreversibility,
similarity-based attack breaches all the criteria mentioned
above.
Brute-force inversion assumes by given transformed
templates with or without helper data, an adversary may
obtain an exact or approximate original template. The at-
tack could be largely resisted if the transformation is a
many-to-one function [8] or salted [9]. On the other hand,
similarity-based attack (SA) attempts to find a preimage,
an inverse of the transformed template, which may or may
not close to original template that against irreversibility cri-
terion. Furthermore, an attacker can leverage the preim-
age with the compromised helper data to impersonate the
genuine user even his/her template is protected. Accord-
ingly, cross-matching also become possible when the as-
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sociated application-specific helper data is known. SA is
enabled by the similarity preserving property of the can-
cellable biometric transformation while this property is es-
sential to achieve non-degradation in terms of accuracy per-
formance after transformation. To be specific, the distance
or similarity between templates in the original space should
preserve relatively in its transform domain. Hence, SA uti-
lizes the distances relationships between templates instead
of the exact distances between them for inversion [10, 11].
In literature, SA is often ignored while the rest of the attacks
have became a must component to overcome wherever a
new CB scheme is designed [9, 12] .
There are a few realizations of SA. In 2010, Nagar et
al. propose a method to find preimage based on a given
BioHashing template (A salting-based CB scheme) and its
parameters [13]. The Biohashing is formulated as an (ap-
proximated) linear equation system and the reconstruction
problem is solved via a bounded least-squares solver. How-
ever, this method does not work on non-linear systems and
sensitive to outlier [14].
In 2012, Feng et al. propose a two-step method to re-
trieve preimage from binary transformed templates [15] . In
the first step, given a binary template b, the bases wp, and
the threshold tp, the reconstruction to real-valued templates
problem can be solved by using a Perceptron. In the second
step, a modified hill-climbing algorithm is used to construct
the fake face image from the real-valued template. Despite
this scheme can achieve good performance, the implemen-
tation is complex. The latest work about SA is published
in 2019 [11] . The authors justify theoretically most of the
existing CB schemes are highly susceptible to SA as they
largely rely on the similarity preserving property to main-
tain accuracy performance. However, no implementation is
given in this work.
Despite a handful of works of SA has been proposed,
they are either method or biometric modality dependence
or of inefficient, such as hill climbing that requires long
iterations. In this paper, we introduce a Genetic Algo-
rithm based similarity-based attack framework (GASAF)
that works efficiently, effectively and easily irrespective to
CB algorithm or biometric modality. With this framework,
we break two well-known cancellable schemes, namely
BioHashing [16] on deep model face features and Bloom-
filter [17] on IrisCode [18]. We made our source code avail-
able at https://bit.ly/2FduSYl.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose a framework of similarity-based attack by
means of GA (GASAF). The GASAF can be applied
to CB schemes that transformed real-valued and binary
biometrics templates. The former instance is face fea-
ture vector that generated by the deep network and the
latter is IrisCode.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Original Space
Hash Space
Bucket
Figure 1. Locality sensitive hashing (LSH)
• We demonstrate the GASAF can find the preimage
from its transformed counterparts in an efficient and
effective manner.
• We design a set of new metrics to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the similarity-based attack for cancellable
biometrics.
2. Background
In this section, we first provide a brief account of Lo-
cality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) in which most of the CB
schemes based upon and then followed by the description
of BioHashing and Bloom-filter.
Cancellable biometrics schemes leverage similarity pre-
serving property to enable accuracy performance preserva-
tion. More specifically, given two biometric feature sets
X,Y ∈ Rd in its original feature space, they are trans-
formed into a new space as X ′, Y ′ ∈ Rm , and the dis-
tance between X and Y should be nearly preserved in the
new space Rm. Therefore, matching can be accomplished
in the transformed domain. LSH is one such a notion used
as a transformation function in CB attributed to its simi-
larity/distance preserving characteristic. LSH aims to map
similar items into same ”buckets” with a maximized proba-
bility (see Figure 1 ).
Given the LSH familyH = {hi : Rd → S} which maps
data points from Rd to a bucket s ∈ S , and the similarity
function d(·), for any two given points X,Y ∈ Rd,the LSH
family satisfies the following conditions :
Ph∈H(h(X) = h(Y )) ≤ γ, if d(X,Y ) < α
Ph∈H(h(X) = h(Y )) ≥ δ, if d(X,Y ) > β
(1)
where δ > γ.
BioHashing is a representative salting-based generic CB
scheme [16]. It is a two-factor scheme based on the user-
specific token, act as salt (helper data) and real-valued bio-
metric feature vector, and followed by a binarization proce-
dure. The n-bit BioHash code c of a feature vector x ∈ RN
is computed as c = Sgn(
∑
xbi − τ), where Sgn(·) is a
signum function, and τ is an empirically determined thresh-
old, and bi ∈ RN , i = 1, ..., n(n ≤ N) is a random vec-
tor. The Hamming distance is computed between two hash
codes to indicate the similarity between two biometric vec-
tors. New instance of x can be reissued by replacing a newly
generated pseudo-random vector.
The theory of Biohashing is grounded in random pro-
jection (RP), which is an instance of LSH. RP is a process
of projecting feature vector from n dimensions tom dimen-
sions (n m) in the Euclidean space by using random ma-
trices [12]. RP is based on Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma
(J-L lemma) [19] that warrants the points from a high-
dimensional space can be embedded onto low-dimensional
space while preserving the distance approximately.
Bloom-filter is an instance of LSH and it is adapted as
a means of generic CB schemes [20]. In bloom-filter, the
biometric feature is mapped to a bit array b with several
independent hashing functions, where b is an bit-array of
length n, b ∈ [0, 1]n. Specifically, k(k  n) indepen-
dent hash functions denoted as h1, h2, ..., hk are pre-defined
first, then each element in set S is hashed and the hashed re-
sult is derived as k indices. Finally, set all k indices of the
bit-array b to unity. At the verification stage, the bit-array
of the query element y is matched to the stored template
by means of hamming distance. The Bloom-filter is pro-
posed on IrisCode by Rathgeb et. al [17]. In their approach,
the W × H IrisCode is divided into K blocks where each
block consists of l = W/K columns of codewords. The
word size of each codeword is denoted as ω bits. Finally
K Bloom-filters with length of 2ω bits are generated as the
transformed template.
3. Similarity-Based Attack via Genetic Algo-
rithm
In this section, a general framework of SA is presented
firstly, followed by a detailed implementation based on Ge-
netic Algorithm. Finally the evaluation metrics of SA is
proposed.
3.1. Framework of Similarity-Based Attack
The essential part of the similarity-based attack is to gen-
erate the original template approximately (preimage) based
on an initial guess of template instance. SA can be launched
by solving the following minimization problem:
argmin
xˆ
‖x− xˆ‖, (2)
where x is the original template and xˆ is the pre-image
of x. Given a CB transformation function h(·), the rela-
tive distance of two transformed templates should be pre-
served with respect to their counterparts in the original
space, hence (3) can be rewritten as:
argmin
xˆ
d(h(xˆ), h(x)), (3)
where d(·) indicates an algorithm-specific distance function
and h(x) is the compromised template in the database. The
cost function of the optimization problem can be defined as:
s ≈ d(h(xˆ), h(x)), (4)
It is worth noting that the h(·) is the CB transformation
function that possess similarity preserving property. The
x can be manifested in the form including discrete (binary
or integer) and continuous-valued.
As suggested by [21] and [11], xˆ can be estimated by
a search algorithm based on the similarity preserving char-
acteristic of their transformed counterparts. Basically the
process of estimating the best solution resembles number
guess game wherein several steps are taken to ’guess’ the
best xˆ:
1. Define the solution space and generate the first guess
randomly;
2. Project the guessed xˆ into the transform space with
h(·);
3. Compute the cost of the guessed xˆ by its cost func-
tion (4);
4. Generate a new guess based on the current guess and
compute the cost. Repeat step 2 to step 4 until the stop
condition is met.
3.2. Genetic Algorithm
GA is a commonly used robust search algorithm that
simulates the genetic mechanism of the biology world such
as mutation, crossover and selection. Like the biological
evolution, GA repeatedly modifies a population of individ-
ual solutions to drive the population to evolve into a optimal
solution. The children generation generally can be formed
by three types of manipulations:
• Selection: select the individuals as parents, which is
used to generate the next generation.
• Crossover: combine or exchange some part of two par-
ents to form children for the next generation.
• Mutation: apply random changes to individual parents
to form children.
Specifically, the solution space encoding is generated firstly,
and the first population is initialized randomly.A fitness
function is designed to evaluate how optimal the individ-
ual in the population is, and the aforementioned three types
of manipulation are used to form the next generation. Then
same fitness function is used to evaluate the individual in
the children population and continue the above procedures
repeatedly (see Algorithm 1). Over successive generations,
Algorithm 1: Genetic Algorithm Based Similarity-
Based Attack
INPUT: CB transform function h(·), compromised
template h(x), fitness function s(·)
OUTPUT: Best individual of xˆ
Solution space encoding and population initialization;
Evaluate initial individuals by fitness function;
while !stopCondition do
Selection of the best-fit individuals for next
generation;
Generate new child by crossover and mutation
operations;
Evaluate new individuals by fitness function
according to (4);
Replace the least-fit population with new
individuals;
end
GA drives the population to evolve into a optimal solution.
Until the newly generated individuals xˆ reach the threshold
of the fitness function or the average change in the fitness
value less than certain threshold, the best individual is re-
turned by GA. GA can be used to solve various optimization
problems even though the objective function is discontinu-
ous, non-differentiable, stochastic, or highly nonlinear.
3.3. Similarity-Based Attack Evaluation Metrics
The key idea of SA is to find the preimage xˆ of the orig-
inal template x based on the compromised template h(x).
Let T1 be the helper data that associated to h(x) in an ap-
plication. We denote this process as xˆ← {h(x), T1}. With
xˆ, the attacker can gain access to other applications if xˆ sat-
isfies d(h(xˆ, T2), h(x, T2)) < θ, where d(·) is a distance
function and θ is the system threshold.
For clarity, the matching scores under a few scenarios are
defined as follows:
• Genuine scores: In a biometric authentication system,
the similarity matching score between two transformed
templates from same identity by same helper data is
named as Genuine score;
• Imposter scores: Matching score from different iden-
tity by same helper data is known as Imposter scores;
• Mated-SA-Imposter scores: In the proposed SA, an
attacker attempts to estimate the user original template,
then use the preimage xˆ to access another application.
Under this situation, the matching score computed
among h(xˆ) and its corresponding transformed tem-
plate in the target database, i.e. s = 1−d(h(xˆ), h(x)),
is named as Mated-SA-Imposter scores (see Figure 2).
Similarity score
Frequency
Threshold θ
Imposter Genuine
Mated-SA-Imposter
Figure 2. Score distribution shifting
Normally, the threshold value θ in Figure 2 should be
chosen to minimize the False Accept Rate (FAR) of the
system. However, under SA, the Mated-SA-Imposter score
distribution can ’shift’ to the right as illustrated in Figure 2.
This shift implies more matching scores will exceed thresh-
old thus become easier to gain access to the system.
Based on the above discussion, the overlapping region
of the Imposter and Mated-SA-Imposter score distributions,
denoted as OL, is used to evaluate the system’s resistances
to SA. If OL = 1, this indicates the Mated-SA-Imposter
and Imposter are overlapped totally, hence the attacker
would fail to gain access. Otherwise, OL = 0 implies the
attacker can easily gain access with xˆ since the matching
score is greater than the threshold.
To compute the overlapping region of two distributions,
we assume the score distribution follows Gaussian distri-
bution for simplistic. Let S1 be the Imposter score and
S2 be the Mated-SA-Imposter, hence S1 ∼ N(µ1, δ1),
S2 ∼ N(µ2, δ2) where µ1 < µ2. Let c denote the in-
tersection point of the overlapping region, the area of the
intersection zone can be computed as:
OL = P (S1 > c) + P (S2 < c). (5)
Even though OL can be used to indicate the score distribu-
tion shifting, the overlapping area depends on the specific
score distribution, hence may not reflect the exact shift-
ing circumstance. Hence apart from the overlapping of the
distribution (shifting), a more practical indicator - false ac-
cept rate (FAR) under the pre-defined threshold is also used
to measure the system’s resistance to SA. The pre-defined
threshold in this work is determined based on the match-
ing score corresponding to the Equal Error Rate (EER) of
the Genuine and Imposter scores. The Mated-SA-Imposter
scores is used to compute the FAR of SA under threshold of
EER, and here we denote as FAR@ET (FAR at EER thresh-
old).
Table 1. Similarity-based attack evaluation on BioHashing (%).
Normal Attack
Bits
length l
Threshold
θ
EER
FAR
@ET
FAR
@ET OL
16 0.56 19.95 24.12 28.28 94.45
32 0.59 12.76 12.48 14.22 94.18
64 0.59 7.80 7.11 11.35 86.74
100 0.58 6.56 6.81 14.33 78.73
200 0.57 5.49 5.43 28.78 53.93
300 0.56 5.34 5.18 51.62 38.52
400 0.56 5.48 5.57 72.20 28.38
500 0.56 5.29 5.22 85.54 19.22
4. Experiments
To validate GASAF, two representative CB schemes are
employed. BioHashing is tested firstly on a face benchmark
dataset, i.e LFW. Then Bloom-filter is evaluated on a iris
dataset, i.e. CASIA-Iris-Interval.
To explore the capability of successive attack for Bio-
Hashing, LFW [? ] is used in this work to compute the
above scores distribution under different simulations. In
LFW, the subjects who have more than 10 images are se-
lected and the first 10 images are choose to form a new small
dataset denoted as LFW10 (158 users). The face feature of
LFW10 is extracted by a deep network namely InsightFace
(a.k.a ArcFace) [? ].
As for Bloom-filter, the left eye images in the CASIA-
v4-Iris-Interval (The Center of Biometrics and Secu-
rity Research, http://www.cbsr.ia.ac.cn/china/Iris Databases
CH.asp) are used to generate the IrisCode [18] by Libor
Masek’s methold [? ].
4.1. BioHashing
In this work, the resistance to SA for BioHashing tem-
plate h(x) with different bit size l is evaluated. Firstly, the
EER, FAR of BioHashing system under helper data stolen
scenario (all users use the same helper data), denoted as
sys1 is setup. The system threshold θ is fixed with respect
to the system EER. Next, the SA is launched to find each
user’s pre-image (deep features) xˆ from a transform tem-
plate stored in a compromised system sys1. The h(xˆ) is
then used as a mated-SA-imposter to match with h(x) in
sys2 to generate the mated-SA-imposter scores. Finally the
FAR@ET under the threshold θ, and the overlapping area
OL of imposter and mated-SA-imposter distribution are re-
ported (see Table 1, Figure 3).
The results reveal several interesting points:
• For a BioHashing secured biometric system, the longer
BioHash code can achieve better accuracy perfor-
mance in terms of EER and FAR@ET.
• However, under SA, longer BioHash code leads to
poor FAR@ET, which implies weak resistance to the
similarity-based attack. This is not surprising as the
longer BioHash code suggests contain more infor-
mation, thus can bring decent accuracy performance.
However, more information implies lower attack com-
plexity.
• As shown in Figure 3, the longer BioHash code will
cause larger shifting of the mated-SA-imposter distri-
bution, and this leads to more instances which can ex-
ceed the threshold and gain access to the system.
It is worth to point out that short BioHash code does not
imply better security, since it is vulnerable to brute-force
inversion attack. Thus both long and short templates are not
recommended.
4.2. Bloom-filter
In this paper, the Bloom-filter is implemented as de-
scribed in [17] without using the key, since we focus on
irreversibility instead of revocability. The IrisCode is eval-
uated by Equal Error Rate (EER). We follow the settings in
[17] and the EER of ±8 bits shifting and direct matching of
IrisCode is calculated. In our experiment, the EER of ±8
bits shifting matching is 3.46% while the direct Hamming
matching is 21.6%.
Bloom-filter has two parameters, i.e. word size ω and
block size l. In this work we fix the block size as 26, and
the word size rangers from 8 to 10 bits. We consider two
SA variants:
• Attack 1-template: SA attack based on one compro-
mised template per subject.
• Attack n-templates: SA attack based on multiple com-
promised templates per subject (n = 3 templates in
this work), i.e. xˆi ← {h(xji )}, where i denotes i-
th subject, j = 1, 2, 3. The fitness is calculated as
s ≈ mean(d(h(xˆ), h(xji ))).
The experiment is reported in Table 2. Firstly we can find
that the SA attack can increase the FAR@ET under Attack
1-template. Unsurprisingly, Attack n-templates can signif-
icantly increase the FAR@ET compared with 1-template.
This is due to more information are presented.Overall, we
can conclude it is feasible to perform SA attack on Bloom-
filter.
4.3. Time cost
The time efficiency of the GASAF is evaluated in this
section. By setting the BioHash code to 200 bits, the time
spend for BioHashing are recorded. The machine we use
for simulation is equipped with a MATLAB Ver. 2018b,
Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3770 CPU @ 3.40GHz and 16GB
RAM. To reconstruct a face biometric feature, 35.8 seconds
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3. Score distribution shifting of BioHashing under attack. The bits length l of (a),(b),(c) are 100,300,500 respectively.
Table 2. Similarity-based attack evaluation on Bloom-filter (%) with block size 26.
Normal Attack 1-template Attack n-templates, n=3
Word Size
ω
Threshold
θ
EER FAR@ET FAR@ET OL FAR OL
8 0.27 14.07 13.99 38.03 33.59 74.21 29.96
9 0.19 13.88 14.05 17.32 38.85 52.27 40.40
10 0.14 14.22 14.19 13.86 45.19 42.88 50.37
(a)
(b)
Figure 4. Time cost (a): BioHashing under l = 200 bits, (b)
Bloom-filter under ω = 8 bits.
is spent for a template. As shown in Figure 4 (a), only 50
generations is needed to find the best solution.
As for Bloom-filter, Attack-1-template with ω = 8 is
used to evaluate the time cost. Under this setting, it takes
average 2175 seconds, 1500 generations to complete one
attack (Figure 4 (b)). Even though it takes around 30 min-
utes to complete one attack, Bloom-filter remains high risk
under SA.
In a nutshell, the result shows that the proposed attack
can be time efficient and has great potential risk in real life.
5. Conclusion
In this work, we present a framework of Genetic Al-
gorithm based similarity-based attack (GASAF) on can-
cellable biometrics. The GASAF can be launched on real-
valued and binary based biometric templates. To evalu-
ate the resistance to similarity-based attack, the overlap-
ping area of Imposter and Mated-SA-Imposter distributions
and FAR@ET are proposed. Two representative cancellable
biometrics, namely BioHashing and Bloom-filter have been
used as case study for this paper.
Similarity-based attack exploits similarity preserving
characteristics of cancellable biometrics to breach the bio-
metric security while similarity preserving is a vital ingre-
dient to keep accuracy performance intact after transforma-
tion. This suggests the trade-off of security and perfor-
mance is inevitable in cancellable biometric schemes. To
alleviate similarity-based attack, we recommend that the
system should carefully tune the parameters to achieve a
balance between security and accuracy. From this work, we
notice if higher accuracy is needed, then the template must
capture enough information eg. long transformed code.
However, this will lead to information leakage and weak
resist to similarity-based attack. On the other hand, small
code is vulnerable to brute-force inversion attack.
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